

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

4/24

ER

The attached is for your
file -

I have shown comments to
Ex Dir and, at his request, to Hutchinson
and Ruten -

Ex Dir wants it retained only
in ER -



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4 February 1986

NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI

FROM : EXDIR

SUBJECT : Proposal to Reconsider IC Staff

I find myself in agreement with much of what Fred suggests. His memo also gives me an opportunity to share my conviction that the IC Staff should only handle community budget matters, that the NIC should only handle community productions matters, and that all other community responsibilities which the Director must deal with should be handled either by line components or, where that is impossible, by special assistants. Implementing such a philosophy would, I think, clarify the rules for all concerned and better focus accountability for results on specific individuals. I think such an approach should also make it easier to see when we ought to consider a new special assistant to help us work on an emerging issue, and when we ought to dispense with one who is no longer serving our needs.

Although General Stilwell's appointment appears to be a short-term one, I am struck by the sensible and straightforward approach to a problem which his hiring represents. The task in this case can't effectively be accomplished by the IC Staff, or by our own CI Staff or the Office of Security. Rather, it involves all three. It seems to me very smart in such a circumstance to find an uninvolved person with stature to help us resolve all the issues. Even more important than coordinating all our views, however, is the problem of laying out an action plan for the future. What you both so often need, it seems to me, is objective help in deciding what we ought to be doing about some given issue, and assistance in orchestrating a sensible attack on the problem. Occasionally establishing a "Special Assistant for....." position seems to me to convey a clear indication of the priority you attach to a selected task in a way that merely adding a function to the IC Staff or another NIO to the NIC never will.

Att: NIC 00466-86

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I agree with
Fred on the
General problem
+ CETS.

Rg

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00466-86
28 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities

SUBJECT : Time to Reconsider the IC Staff?

1. This is a brief note to suggest that we may be approaching a point in the evolution of the Intelligence Community Staff where it would be appropriate to critically evaluate its size, some details of its mission, and how it functions in relationship to the DCI and other line managers in the Community.

2. One issue prompting my suggestion is the role the IC Staff plays, or is perceived to play, in the counterintelligence and countermeasures arena. For some months I have been troubled by the tendency of Community Counterintelligence Staff to view itself as an extension of the NSC staff element dealing with CI and CM matters. The professional affinity among the officers in the two groups has become more pronounced in the past several years because of the total absence of CIA officers in the CCIS and the low profile assumed by the CIA officers who have been in the intelligence element of the NSC staff under deGraffenreid. While there are some positive aspects of a close relationship here, one should be concerned about the drift into a relationship where:

- the CCIS describes itself as reporting to the NSC Staff;
- the draft SSCI "Interim Report on Espionage and Security" refers to the ICS and CCIS role in "assistance to the NSC Staff" and "implementation of national counterintelligence policy";
- the growing tendency of the NSC Staff to see the IG/CI and IG/CM as its tools rather than as subordinate elements of the SIG-I reporting to its chairman, the DCI.

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3. The ICS and CCIS self-perception as an arm of the NSC Staff and non-CIA elements of the Community rather than as an extension of the DCI is, by itself, a disturbing phenomenon. When that perception spreads to the intelligence oversight committees and pervades the SSCI Staff report it is time to at least mark a time on the calendar to deal with the issue.

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NIC #00466-86


4. The second issue prompting this memorandum is the intrusion of the IC Staff into substantive areas and its growing dominance of resource issues; a dominance achieved largely at the expense of the intelligence producers. The description of the IC Staff role as described by [redacted] in his "Collection System Procurement: Decision Making in the Intelligence Community" is worth your attention and could serve as the starting point for deliberation (see attachment).

I disagree
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5. It appears to me that remedial action is required along the lines of:

- establish a stronger CIA presence in the NSC Staff element dealing with intelligence;
- maintain an effective CIA presence in the CCIS;
- reorient the C/CCIS toward his role in support of the DCI;
- reduce the size of the IC Staff;
- deemphasize IC Staff role in substantive areas such as intelligence production and collection priorities.

6. To reiterate, this is merely a suggestion that it is time to critically reconsider the IC Staff as an instrument of the DCI. This is a notation of symptoms and not a diagnosis of the problem. Perhaps it is time to make the diagnosis and develop a concept for change in policy which could accompany changes in personnel at a later date.


H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

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Extract from
pp. 8-9
Collection System Procurement
Decision Making in the Intelligence Community

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THE IC STAFF ROLE

The growth of the IC Staff, and especially the multiplication of its functions into substantive and judgmental areas, is viewed as not being beneficial for resource investment decision.

To be specific:

- The subordination of the DCI's collection committees to the IC Staff has for all practical purposes eliminated the key role of the committee chairmen -- to be the senior Community advisers to the DCI in their respective areas. No one has effectively filled this gap.
- The studies of the CIPC tend to examine problem areas which have already been recognized and well understood by the analytic elements of the Community long before CIPC deliberations begin.
- The recommendations of the CIPC for corrective action in collection are narrowly focused on each particular problem, and provide a shopping list whose effect, if implemented, on other problems has not been assessed. This emphasizes the piecemeal nature of Community planning.
- The requirements and priorities produced by the Foreign Intelligence and Priorities Committee (previously known as the DCID 1/2 Committee) do not serve as the guidance needed for making collection resource procurement decisions.
- Identification of budget issues is almost entirely under the control of the IC Staff. The Community in general, and in particular the intelligence producers, have very little opportunity to influence choice of issues. They have even less opportunity to prepare a response; normally the issues are disseminated only two or three days prior to the NFIC meeting in November.
- The chairman of the IPC represents the producers at NFIC meetings which address NFIP resource allocation. No matter how well prepared Ch/IPC is for these meetings, there is little he can do in one hour to offset IC Staff control over the previous eleven months and three weeks.

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